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3.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

i. Nature of the Case

This

is an appeal of the denial by the

attorney's

fees

under Idaho Code

12-120 (4)

§

plaintiff parties after a jury trial.

District Court of
to two prevailing

This appeal challenges the

denial of attorney's fees based on the District Judge's belief that
substantial new claims were asserted in the complaint and at trial,
and after the Court expressed some hope that an appeal be filed to
get some clarification on these issues; see R Vol. III, p. 487, L.

l

7, and Tr 502, L. 6-7.
ii. Course of Proceedings Below

The plaintiffs and appellants Mathew Bennett and Benjamin
Wal ton

(collectively called plaintiffs herein or by their last

names Bennett and Walton), both made a written demand for payment
of their personal injury claims to the defendant and respondent
Nancy

Patrick's

herein),

sixty

Idaho Code

§

insurer
(60)

Allstate

Insurance

Company

(Allstate

days before the litigation was filed,

12-120 (4).

A true and correct copy of this demand

letter is attached as Exhibit 161, and is found at R Vol.
258-260.
I

The

demand

medical expenses,
pain and suffering.
p.

318-319.

under

letter

included

claims

for

past

II, p.
accrued

future estimated medical expenses, lost wages,
See also attached Damage Summaries, R Vol. II,

A list of medical

records attached to the demand

letter set out on Exhibit Index Lists at R Vol. I, p. 178-182, and
p. 240-244 as stipulated exhibits later admitted into evidence.
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The District Court found that the demand letter complied in
all material respects with Idaho Code§ 12-120(4).

A copy of the

plaintiffs' Exhibit List with all medical records in possession of
the plaintiffs' were attached to the demand letter.

The plaintiffs

waited a period of over 60 days before filing their complaint.

See

R Vol. III, p. 485.
In response to the plaintiffs' demand letter

(R Vol.

II, p.

258-260) on August 20, 2008 Allstate offered Walton $4,600.00; see
R Vol

I I,

Allstate

p.

2 61.

made

a

There
"final

was

then

other

to

settle

offer"

correspondence,
Walton's

case

and
for

$5,000.00; R Vol. II, p. 262.
In response to the plaintiffs' demand letter
258-260),

Allstate's

first

offer

to

was

II, p.

$2,300.00,

See copy of Allstate letter

including $710.45 for medical care.
dated August 20,

Bennett

(R Vol.

2008 found at R Vol.

II, p. 265.

Subsequently,

there was additional correspondence between the parties.

Allstate

later increased their offer to Bennett to $2,500.00 in a letter
dated September 26,

2008.

See copy of the Allstate letter dated

September 26, 2008 found at R Vol. II, p. 266.
The plaintiffs then filed the underlying case of Mathew R.

Bennett and Benjamin L.
Case No.

CV-08-4528-PI.

Walton v.

Nancy Patrick;

The plaintiffs'

Bannock County

Verified Complaint for

Personal Injury Damages in Automobile Collision and Demand for Jury
Trial was filed against Nancy Patrick on November 6, 2008.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

A copy

2

of the Verified Complaint with exhibits is found in the CLERK'S
RECORD on appeal at R Vol.
The

Verified

$25,000.00,

and

I, p. 1-13.

Complaint

sought

was

attorney's

filed
fees

for
under

an

amount

Idaho

Code

under
§

12-

120 ( 4), as stated specifically in the Prayer at paragraphs A and B,
last sentence, and paragraph Con attorney's fees; see R Vol. I, p.
7-8, copy attached for the convenience of the Court.

The Prayer of

the Verified Complaint stated in pertinent part as follows:
E.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE,
plaintiffs,
Mathew R.
Bennett
and
Benjamin L. Walton, pray for judgments against defendant,
Nancy Patrick, as vehicle owner, responsible party and
negligent driver as follows:
A.
Special damages for plaintiff Mat Bennett's
past medical bills of $1,939.71, future medical bills for
over the counter pain medication, and lost wages of
$2,600.00; and general damages for pain and suffering in
an amount in excess of $10,000.00, or such other amounts
as may be proven to a jury at trial, but less than
$25,000.00 at this time;
B.
Special damages for plaintiff Ben Walton's
medical bills of $2,992.92, future medical bills £or over
the counter pain medication, lost wages of $1,200.00, and
general damages for pain and suffering in an amount in
excess 0£ $10,000.00, or such other amounts as may be
proven to a jury at trial, but less than $25,000.00 at
this time;
C.
For attorney's fees and costs in bringing this
action, in the amount of $2,000.00 if by default and
future attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(4); and
D.
For such other and further relief as this Court
deems
just and equitable under the premises
for
plaintiff.
*** (Emphasis Supplied).
The defendant Patrick filed her Answer and Demand for Jury
Trial on December 4, 2008.
affirmative defense

See R Vol. I, p. 14-20.

raised that

the demand letter

failed to comply with Idaho Code§ 12-120(4).
APPELLANTS' BRIEF

There was no
or Complaint

There were defenses
3

raised

of

comparative

fault,

and

that

(unbeknownst

to

the

plaintiffs) the defendant Nancy Patrick had filed bankruptcy.
Therefore, in defendant Patrick's bankruptcy case, the parties
entered into a Stipulation for Stay Relief In Re: Nancy D. Patrick,
Idaho Chapter 7 No Asset Bankruptcy Case No. 08-40764-JDP; found at
R Vol. III, p. 459-460.

This stipulation expressly agreed that the

plaintiffs would not pursue any claim in State Court against the
defendant,

!

insurance

personally,
policy,

for any amount in excess of her Allstate

which

had

policy

person, and $50,000.00 per accident.

limits

of

$25,000.00,

per

See R 381-382, 401-461, and

391 (Allstate Insurance declaration sheet).

The Bankruptcy Court

approved this stipulation in an Order Granting Relief from Stay
from Bankruptcy Judge Jim D. Pappas at R Vol. III, p. 389-390.
The plaintiffs then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on
April 13, 2009.

See R Vol. I, p. 21-24.

The motion was supported

by an affidavit of an eye witness, and the Verified Complaint, that
the defendant Patrick had pulled onto a busy through street from
behind a steam roller without looking or yielding, which caused the

I

collision.

The plaintiffs also filed a Motion to Compel on that

same date.

See R Vol. I, p. 25-52.

The

defendant

then

filed

a

response

and

memorandum

in

opposition to the plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment together
with the Affidavit of Nancy Patrick on April 27, 2009.
I,

p.

53-61.

In her Affidavit,

See R Vol.

Nancy Patrick testified,

under

oath, that she saw the plaintiff Walton's truck, he was speeding
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and should have been able to avoid the collision, so Walton was at
fault and there was comparative negligence by Walton in this case.
I

See R Vol Ip. 60.

The plaintiffs

filed a Response

in Support of

Motion for Summary Judgment on May 6, 2009.
77.

A hearing was

held on

District Judge David C.

the motions

Nye presiding.

Judgment was denied without prejudice.

Plaintiffs'

See R Vol. I, p. 68-

on May 11,

2009 with

The Motion for Summary
See R Vol. I, p. 79-80.

The parties then completed written discovery and depositions.
The plaintiffs filed a First Amended and Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment on November 19, 2009, together with the transcripts of the
depositions.

See

R Vol.

I,

p.

81-127.

The

defendant

Patrick

testified, under oath, in her deposition that she· did not even see
the plaintiffs' truck before the collision, did not know the speed
limit on the road,

she was unaware of any facts that would show

negligence on the part of the plaintiffs, and there were no facts
to support the allegations made in her Affidavit at all.
The defendant's attorney then filed an Affidavit of Brendon
Taylor with supplemental discovery on December 21, 2009, on the eve
of the re-scheduled summary judgment hearing.
128 132.

I

In

this

response

the

defendant

See R Vol.

Patrick

I, p.

amended her

earlier response to the plaintiffs'

request for admission in her

Answer to Request for Admission No.

10, to admit negligence and

liability for the accident for the first time.
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The Court

issued an Order Granting Plaintiffs'

Motion for

Summary Judgment on Liability, as stipulated, to by the defendant
on January 4,

2010.

R Vol.

See

I,

p.

136-137.

The plaintiffs

filed a Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit of Charles Johnson in
Support of Motion for Costs and Fees on the summary judgment motion
under
,

!

IRCP

11,

56(g),

and

admissions on liability.
The

defendant

plaintiffs'

motion

36-37

See R Vol.

Patrick
for

on

then

costs

the

requests

for

I, p. 138-149.
filed

and

an

attorney's

judgment as to liability on January 15,
150-159.

denied

2010.

objection
fees

on

to

the

summary

See R Vol.

I, p.

The Court entered a Minute Entry & Order on February 22,

2010 denying the plaintiffs' motion under Rules 11 and 56, and took
under advisement the Rule 36 fee issue.

See R Vol.

I, p. 160-161.

The Court entered the Decision on Costs and Attorney's Fees on
March 12, 2010.

See R Vol.

I, p. 162-169.

The Court held that no

attorney's fees

are be proper under the Idaho Court of Appeals

decision of Payne v. Wallace, 136 Idaho 303, 309, 32 P.3d 695, 701
( Ct .

App .

2001 ) .

The denial was without prejudice to a

later

motion for costs and attorney's fees after the trial, which is now
part of the attorney's fees requested in this appeal.
An Order of Mediation in good faith was issued by the Court.
See R Vol.

I,

p.

170-172.

The final Allstate Offer of Judgment

after mediation for Walton was $6,484.00; R Vol. II, p. 264.
Allstate

then made an Offer of

$3,424.00 to Bennett dated April 29,
Subsequently, on May 18,
APPELLANTS' BRIEF

Judgment

in the

2010 at R Vol.

amount of

II,

p.

266.

2010, Allstate increased their Offer of
6

Judgment to Bennett to $4,432.00; see Offer of Judgment R Vol. II,
p.

267.

This

Offer

of

Judgment

was

received

by

facsimile

transmission exactly 14 days before the jury trial.
The defendant Patrick then requested an Independent Medical
Examination (IME)

by Dr.

David Simon in Idaho Falls,

Idaho.

His

IME reports were favorable to the plaintiffs (discussed more fully
below),

and

afterward

the

defendant

Patrick admitted

that

the

plaintiffs' past medical expenses were valid and not disputed.
A Stipulated Joint Pre-Trial Memorandum was entered on May 14,
2010.

See R Vol.

I,

p.

172-189.

This stipulated into evidence

most of the plaintiffs' past medical records, and payment of their
past medical

bills

and expenses,

that

were

submitted with

demand letter, but not the IME reports of Dr. Simon.

the

The defendant

had admitted liability, and the plaintiffs' past medical expenses,
so the only issues at trial were the plaintiffs' damages including:
estimated future medical expenses

for

care and treatment,

lost

wages for one to two weeks for each plaintiff, and damages for pain
and suffering.
The

R Vol. I, p. 177 at paragraph K.

jury trial

took place over

two days

and

is

discussed

below; see also Minute Entry & Order at R Vol. II, p. 194-201, and
245-248,

and Jury

Instructions

at

R Vol.

II,

p.

194-239.

The

Stipulation and Order for Admission of Exhibits is in the Record at
R Vol. II, p. 240-244.

These were the same claims that were always made in this case,
and did not change during the course of the proceedings.
APPELLANTS' BRIEF
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The Judgment on Verdict was entered on June 7, 2010.
Vol. II, p. 203-205.

I

See R

The judgment awarded damages as follows:

Bennett

$3,978.47; and

Walton

$10,030.92.

The plaintiffs filed a Motion for Additur or new trial or to
alter and amend the judgment on the verdict in this case to award
Bennett an additional amount for other medical care and for nonprescription pain medications in the amount of $1,000.00, double
the amounts of pain and suffering awarded to each plaintiff, and
award pre judgment interest on the stipulated past medical expenses
from

the

date

they

were

incurred.

This

was

based

on

the

defendant's statements that worker's compensation insurance existed
or was somehow an issue in this case, speculation by the jury as to
seatbelts,

and air bags in the defendant's closing argument,

other factors.

or

See Supplemental Record Exhibits A and B.

The plaintiffs filed a Motion for Costs and Attorney's Fees of
the

Prevailing

Party on

the

Jury Verdict

and Judgment

on

the

Verdict (found at R Vol. II, p. 249-250), and a Memorandum of Costs
and Affidavit of Charles Johnson in Support of Motion for Costs and
Fees on June

18,

2010

(found at

R Vol.

II,

p.

251-301).

Memorandum and Affidavit included the demand letter,

The

responses to

the demand letter, the Offers of Judgment, an Itemized Statement or
Bill for all time spent by counsel for each plaintiff in the case.
The Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant's Motion for Costs also had
the actual bills and invoices attached at R Vol.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

II, p. 342-361.

8

The plaintiffs also filed a Memorandum and Brief in Support of
Attorney's Fees in the Supplemental Record as Exhibit C.
The defendant

filed a motion for

costs and memorandum for

See R Vol. II, p. 302-312.

costs on June 21, 2010.

The defendant

filed a motion for reduction of judgment on June 21,
Vol.

2010.

See R

II, p. 313-327.
The plaintiffs filed an opposition to the defendant's motion

for reduction to judgment on July 6, 2010.
331.

See R Vol. II, p. 328-

The plaintiffs filed an objection to the defendant's motion

See R Vol. II, p. 332-341.

for costs on July 6, 2010.

The defendant filed an objection to the plaintiffs' post-trial
motions for additur, interest, costs and attorney's fees on July 7,
2010.

See R Vol.

II,

p.

362-366.

The only objection to

the

attorney's fees was based on the allegation that substantial new
claims were presented at trial on the plaintiffs'

future medical

care, pain and suffering, primarily because of the testimony of the
IME Dr. Simon, and closing arguments of counsel for the plaintiffs.
R Vol. II, p. 365.

There was no objection or discussion that the

language of the prayer of the complaint somehow did not comply with
the requirements of Idaho Code§ 12-120(4).
The defendant

filed a

supplement to defendant's post-trial

motions, and responsive pleadings on July 22, 2010; see R Vol. II,
p.

374-376.

The Defendant's Post-Hearing Brief,

filed after the

hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for costs and attorney's fees, is
found at
by

the

R Vol. III, p. 449-453.
defendant

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

to

the

There was no claim or objection

plaintiffs'

demand letter

or

that

the
9

complaint did not comply with the requirements of Idaho Code§ 12120(4).
that

the

The defendant's sole objection or claim at that time was
plaintiffs

presented

evidence

at

trial

that

included

significant new items of damages not stated in their demand letter,
in the IME testimony and closing argument on pain and suffering.
The

defendant

also

prevailing party

argued

status

argued that Johnson v.
App.

2004)

claimed,

had

that

under

the

IRCP

Court

54 (d).

should
The

Sanchezr 140 Idaho 667,

allowed

an

increase

in

determine

defendant

also

99 P.3d 620

(Ct.

medical

damages

to

be

but stated that this case did not apply in the Court's

discretion.

The

defendant

also

noted

that

the

bankruptcy

stipulation and order capped the plaintiffs' damages at $25,000.00
per person; since the defendant probably anticipated that the Court
may award additional damages, costs, and attorney's fees.
The Court noted at the hearing held on July 26,

2010 on the

post-trial motions that there was no dispute as to pre-judgment
interest on the stipulated past medical expenses.
was the costs and attorney's fees.

Tr 465.

The key issue

The plaintiffs argued

that their costs and attorney's fees should be awarded since the
jury awarded double the amount
Idaho Code

§

12-120 (4),

judgment under IRCP 68.

of their pre-trial offers

and more
Tr 4 66.

than the

under

augmented offers

of

The Judge noted that there was

prior case law that apparently adopted the plaintiffs'

position.

Tr 467.
The defendant argued that there were new and different claims
for damages.

Tr 468.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

The defendant did not mention or argue that
10

the

complaint

was

defective

or

ambiguous

on

the

claim

for

attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(4).
The Court noted that the Idaho Supreme Court had not adopted
the defendant's position, and it appeared that the plaintiffs had
met or beat the defendant's prior offers.
noted that

what mattered was

beaten, and not by how much.

that

Tr 469-470.

the Offers

The Court

of Judgment

were

Tr 471.

The defendant argued that in the motion for relief from stay
to

allow

the

personal

injury

case

when

Nancy

Patrick

filed

bankruptcy, the parties had stipulated that the defendant would not
be liable for any damages in excess of $25,000.00.

The ref ore,

damages were capped at $25,000.00, not including attorney's fees.
Tr 463-464.

i

The defendant was never personally at

risk for

a

higher verdict in excess of $25,000.00 per person.
The Court
August 25,

issued the decision on post-judgment motions on

2010;

R Vol.

III,

p.

477-491.

The Court recited the

facts of the case pertinent to the motions with respect to the
plaintiffs' demand letter under Idaho Code§ 12-120(4), and Offers
of judgment.

The Court denied the plaintiffs' motion for additur

for additional non-prescription pain medications, and the additur
for pain and suffering, because the Court stated that insurance and
the seatbelt defense evidence was cured with jury instructions, and
the reference to the airbags not deploying was based on photographs
(even

though

there

was

no

testimony

on

that

point

at

all

as

discussed below).

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
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The Court

granted

the plaintiffs

request

for

pre-judgment

interest on the undisputed past medical expenses under Idaho Code
§ 28-22-104.
Vol.

Pre-judgment interest was added to the verdicts.

R

III, p. 479.
The Court

granted the defendant's motion

for

remittur

payment of one of Walton's medical bills by Allstate.
was reduced by the Court accordingly.
The

Court

found

parties in this case.

that

both

R Vol.

plaintiffs

This verdict

III, p.
were

for

the

480.
prevailing

The Court found that Walton was a prevailing

party since the verdict was,

even after reduction for collateral

sources, more than the Offers of Judgment.

The Court also found

that Bennett was a prevailing party based on his adjusted verdict
under IRCP 68(b)

of $4,336.62.

R Vol.

III,

p.

481.

This Court

should note that this was even without considering an award of any
attorney's fees.

R Vol. III, p. 482.

The District Court then awarded the plaintiffs'
matter of right,

and discretionary costs.

costs as a

The Court found,

at R

Vol. III, p. 485, that the plaintiffs had complied with Idaho Code
§ 12-120(4), first and second paragraphs, as follows:
Plaintiffs must have made a statement of claim in the amount
of $25,000 or less sixty days before filing the Complaint.
In
Plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees,
they have attached a
document, which is the demand letter to Allstate Insurance Company,
dated July 9, 2008 (Exhibit 161), which is more than sixty days
prior to the filing of the Complaint.
The letter demands $20,000
for Plaintiff Bennett and $23,000 for Plaintiff Walton, each of
which is less than $25,000.
Defendant attached to her documents
Plaintiffs' Statement of Claims that accompanied the demand letter.
The Defendant has made no objection to the validity of the
submitted demand letter or the Statement of Claims. Thus, at least
initially, I.e. § 12-120(4) applies to this case.
APPELLANTS' BRIEF
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The Court then discussed the plaintiffs' Complaint.

The Court

first said that the Complaint requested general damages of no more
than $25,000.00, and noted that it did expressly discuss Idaho Code
§ 12-120(4); see R Vol. III, p. 486.
R Vol.

III, p.

486)

However, the Court held (at

that the Complaint eventually requested over

$25,000.00 as follows:
The Court, having reviewed Plaintiffs' Complaint,
finds that the Plaintiff Bennett asked for special
damages in the amount of $4,537.71, and general damages
in an amount of more than $10,000, but less than $25,000.
Plaintiff Walton asked for special damages in the amount
of $4,192.92 and general damages in excess of $10,000,
but less than $25,000.
The Court understands each Plaintiff to be asking
for general damages in the amount of no more than
$25,000.
However, the Complaint does not state that
total damages will be less than $25,000. When adding in
the special damages, each Plaintiff's demand would
surpass the I.e.
§ 12-120(4) maximum of $25,000.
Al though the Comp1aint does not inc1ude a different
a11eged injury or a significant new item of damage not
set forth in the statement of c1aim, the Plaintiff's
Complaint does not comply with§ 12-120(4) in that each
P1aintiff asks for more than $25,000. Thus, Plaintiffs
removed their case from the applicability of the statute
when they filed their Complaint.
(Emphasis supplied) .
The

Court

then

held

that

a

different

alleged

significant new item of damage was presented at trial.

I

held at R Vol.

injury

or

The Court

III, p. 486-487 as follows:

The third and final factor is whether the Plaintiffs
included in evidence offered at trial, a different
alleged injury or a significant new item of damage not
set forth in the statement of claim.
The Court has
reviewed the evidence offered at trial and finds that the
P1aintiffs have not a11eged a different injury from that
in the statement of c1aim, but Plaintiffs have included
in their evidence offered at trial a significant new item
of damage not set forth in the statement of claim.
(Emphasis supplied).
APPE~LANTS' BRIEF
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The Plaintiffs provided to the Court their demand
letter dated July 9th, 2010, that was given to the
Defendant's insurer.
The statement of claims for
Plaintiff Bennett was in the amount of $20,600 and for
Plaintiff Walton $23,200.
During the trial,
the
Plaintiffs presented evidence of $30,734.47 in damages
for Plaintiff Bennett and $41,252.72 for Plaintiff
Walton. The Court finds a significant difference in the
amounts
asked
for
from the
time of the demand
letter/statement of claim to the evidence offered at
trial.
The difference in damages leads the Court to
believe that what is being asked is a significant new
item of damage that was not set forth in the statement of
claim.
I. C. § 12-120 ( 4) was intended to encourage
parties to settle when a claim for personal injury is
less than $25,000.
(Emphasis supplied).
The plaintiffs submit that the Court "believes" is
irrelevant in this case. 2

simply

In this case, the Court 1 s belief is not

supported by the record or case law (discussed below), since there
was no different or significant new item of damage presented at
trial, but only argument for increased pain and suffering.
The Court then discussed Johnson v. Sanchez, supra, as cited
by the plaintiffs.

The Court then rejected this rationale and

decision and stated that

it did not

apply to this

case.

The

appellants claim that this is really the key issue on appeal.
The Court, therefore, issued an amended judgment to Walton of
$10,671.63, and Bennett of $5,065.11.

R Vol. III, p. 491.

This

was after all interest and costs but before any attorney fees.
The

plaintiffs

then

filed

a

motion

for

relief

and

reconsideration of the post-judgment motions denying attorney 1 s

2

The plaintiffs may have believed that the Court simply wanted
to help his former law firm employer and partner, but such beliefs
really are irrelevant to this proceeding.
APPELLANTS 1 BRIEF
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fees; R Vol. III, p. 493-494.

The plaintiffs also filed a motion

to amend the complaint to conform with the evidence under I.R.C.P.
15(b) and to make it more clear that the amount they requested was
$25,000.00 or less.

R Vol. III, p. 495-496.

The defendant filed an objection to the plaintiffs' motion.
The defendant admitted that she did not specifically object to the
plaintiffs'

claim

allegations

of

paragraph,

for

the

first

costs

and

Complaint.

two

attorney's
R

Vol.
The

sentences.

fees

III,

based

p.

defendant

498,

on

the

fourth

claimed

the

plaintiffs asserted a significant new item of damages at trial not
set forth in their demand letter.

The defendant also stated that

the Court should deny the motion to amend the complaint as not
being timely filed by the plaintiff.
The hearing on the motion for
September 27, 2010.

reconsideration was held on

The plaintiffs argued that the Complaint was

filed for less than $25,000.00 under Idaho Code§ 12-120(4), but a
motion to amend the complaint had been filed to clarify the record.
Further, there had been no evidence of any significant new item of
damages offered at trial, and there was, at most, only an argument
made for a higher range of verdicts to the jury.

Tr 489-492.

The Court stated that there was an argument for additional
damages at trial, but it was for the same old injuries and nothing
new.

Tr

502,

L.

12-17.

The

Court

stated

that

arguing

a

significant increased amount for the same old injuries warranted
denial of attorney's fees.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
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(amount claimed).

15

The Court noted that the plaintiffs have the right to appeal
and hoped that they do, because there should be some clarification
on this issue.

Tr 502.

The Court issued its Minute Entry & Order denying the motion
to reconsider at R Vol.

III, p. 513-514.

R Vol. III, p. 515-519.
appeal

of the

This appeal followed at

The plaintiffs paid the judgment pending

attorney's

fees

issue.

R Vol.

III,

p.

520-521.

There was no cross appeal filed by the defendant on any issue.

iii.

A Concise Statement of Facts and Evidence at Trial

The plaintiffs called seven
included
Bennett

the
and

plaintiffs
Devan

Walton,

Chiropractor Henry West,
examination
the

only

(IME)

Dr.

evidence

Bennet

(7)
and

witnesses
Wal ton,

Physical

at

their

Therapist

trial.

This

wives

Kelly

Ronald

Rutten,

and the defendant's independent medical

David Simon.

offered

at

Their testimony consisted of

trial

in

this

case,

and

the

plaintiffs' damage summaries were not admitted into evidence after
an objection that they were not evidence;

although there was no

objection to their admission under§ 12-120(4).

Tr 17,

117, and

120.
The jury was instructed that the defendant admitted liability.
Tr 4, and 20.

Therefore, the only issue in the case was the amount

of the plaintiffs' damages for estimated future medical care, lost
wages, pain and suffering.
Vol.

See also jury instructions found at R

II, pages 228 and 235-236, and special verdict at R 192-193.
Kelly Bennett testified that her husband missed work after the

injury.

He went to the emergency room, and then received physical

APPELLANTS'

BRIEF

16

therapy and treatment from Dr. Henry West.

Tr 32, 33-36.

At that

point, the defendant attempted to place into evidence that worker's
compensation insurance should have covered all or part of Bennett's
medical expenses and lost wages.
for

a mis-trial,

insurance

should

The plaintiffs objected and moved

in part based on a
be

placed

into

pre-trial

evidence.

ruling

The

that no

Court

curative instruction that such insurance is irrelevant.

gave

a

Tr 43-50,

R Vol. II, p. 210-211.
Walton testified that he worked as a drywall finisher at the
time of the collision.

He testified as to what happened at the

time of the collision when Nancy Patrick pulled out from behind a
steam roller, on a main road on a through street and collided with
his truck.

Tr 51-52.

Walton was treated at the Portneuf Medical Center emergency
room.

Tr 53.

He was diagnosed with a cervical sprain and strain

and was tender at the C5-6 location of his back.

Tr 56.

He was

placed in a soft cervical collar, and given a work restriction of
not to lift over five to ten pounds.

Tr 55, 59.

He then rested

from work for several days and took one week off work.
He

testified

that

he

had

no

prior

back

Tr 61, 67.

problems

before

the

collision.
Wal ton
Maynard.

then

treated by his

private physician

He had tenderness with muscle spasms,

with medication and heat therapy.

Dr.

Richard

and was treated

Tr 67-71.

He received chiropractic treatment from Dr. Henry West.
West

performed

several

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
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and

prescribed

an

MRI

Dr.

(Magnetic
17

Resonance Imaging) test.

Tr 74-80.

The MRI showed a minor broad-

based posterior disc bulge at C4 and 5 and C5-6.

Tr 81, 83.

Dr. West then treated Walton with chiropractic manipulation,
j

massage, electrical stimulation, ultrasound, and other therapy.

He

was not working during some of this time which apparently helped
his recovery.
medication.

However, he still had back pain and took Ibuprofen
Tr 81-84.

Walton was cross-examined by the defendant's attorney.

His

tax returns showed minimal income, so the jury awarded him no lost
income.

Tr 91-96, and 124.

He had headaches on consul tat ion with Dr.
Simon.

Tr 109.

Maynard and Dr.

On cross-examination Walton testified at trial,

and in his deposition, that he had been referred by Dr. Maynard for
treatment with Dr. West.

Tr 105-106.

The Court ruled again that the damage summaries (Exhibit 153)
could not be admitted into evidence, because pain and suffering was
simply argument and not evidence.

Tr 120.

Bennett then testified that at the time of the collision he
was texting his wife since he was a passenger in the truck.
137-138.

Therefore,

Tr

like Nancy Patrick, he did not actually see

what happened in the collision.
Bennett was treated at the Portneuf Medical Center emergency
room with pain medications and muscle relaxers.
was advised to take bed rest for a few days,
week.

Tr 143-146.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
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Tr 140.

Bennett

and not work for a

the jury awarded only minimal lost

18

wages for about one week; which was the approximate amount of his
paycheck at Kiggins Concrete.

Tr 204.

Bennett was then bending over picking up hand tools while
working and had pain in his back.

Tr 143-144.

to

by

be

related

Holmstead.

I

to

the

collision

Tr 145-146, 158.

muscle spasms.
Bennett

his

This pain was found

treating

physician

Dr.

Dr. Holmstead also found that he had

Id.
then

electrotherapy,

had

physical

heat therapy,

therapy

including

stretching,

and an injection of pain killers.

This gave him some relief but he still continued to work in pain.
Tr 149-156.
Dr. Holmstead would then not treat Bennett further because he
owed a bill.

Bennett then saw chiropractor Dr.

157,

266-268.

159-160,

Henry West.

Bennett then testified that

Dr.

Tr

West's

chiropractic treatment included chiropractic manipulation (in which
he could feel his back pop), ultrasound,
and massage.

electrical stimulation,

Tr 187-188.

Bennett also attended an IME by Dr. David Simon.

At the IME

he hurt his back and he felt it "pop" during a test.

He sought

treatment with Dr. Holmstead, but could not pay, so he was treated
by Dr. West two more times.

Tr 189-192.

Physical Therapist Ronald Rutten testified as to the physical
therapy treatment administered to Bennett, including ice and heat,
electrical

stimulation,

and therapeutic exercise.

Tr

168-172.

Ronald Rutten thought that progress had been made and that Bennett

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
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had improved.

Tr 171-173.

He testified in depth as to his charges

for the physical therapy treatment.

Tr 174-176.

Dr. Henry West is a chiropractic physician in Pocatello, Idaho
that

treated both the

plaintiffs.

Tr 266-229.

stipulated that he was qualified as an expert.

The defendant

Tr 228.

Dr. West testified that he treated Walton for complaints of
neck pain caused

from the

collision a month

earlier.

He was

diagnosed with a cervical sprain or strain and given other tests
that were summarized on Tr pages 233-240.
prescribed an MRI by Dr. West.

Walton was referred and

The MRI was taken at Idaho Medical

Imaging, and showed a minor posterior broad-based disc bulge at CS-

I
6 noted

as

a

cervical

disc

syndrome.

Tr

245-246.

Walton's

objective complaints were consistent with the test results as to
the nature of his reported injury.
had

a

29

percent

guidelines.

impairment

Tr 247.

as

Dr. West found Walton

documented

under

the

GAMA

Tr 253.

Walton was treated with spinal manipulation, ultrasound, and
electrical stimulation.

Tr 254-255.

and no surgery was indicated.
Dr.

His prognosis was favorable

Tr 247 and 265.

Henry West testified that he also treated Bennett.

266-268.

Tr

He was found to have low back pain secondary to a lumbar

strain from the motor vehicle collision (a torsional strain), and
his subjective complaints were substantiated by the record.
269.

He

ultrasound,

was

also

treated

with

chiropractic

and electrical stimulation.

condition improved.
APPELLANTS' BRIEF
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manipulation,

Tr 270-271.

Bennett's

Tr 270.
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Dr. West also treated Bennett for the aggravation of his prior
injury when he was at work,

and at the IME.

Tr 27 0-271.

His

prognosis was good, but he would probably need more treatment and
pain medication.
There

was

Tr 274.
some

cross-examination

seatbelt at the time of the collision.

on

Bennett

Tr 283.

not

using

a

The Court gave a

curative instruction on the seatbelt defense; R Vol. II, p. 230.
Devan Wal ton testified that Ben Wal ton was
collision and had muscle spasms.

injured in the

Tr 294-295, and 301.

Therefore,

he took non-prescription pain medication that cost about $5 to $15
a month.

Tr 296.

Dr. David Simon is a physician in Idaho Falls, Idaho.

He is

the Medical Director of the Rehabilitation Unit of Eastern Idaho
Regional Medical Center (EIRMC), a large hospital, in Idaho Falls,
Idaho.

Tr 324.

He performed an Independent Medical Examination

(IME) for the defendant on both plaintiffs.

Tr 304-5.

The IME on Walton was marked and admitted over the defendant's
objection as Exhibit

13 5.

His medical

history showed no pre-

existing conditions prior to the collision, and his post collision
treatment.

Tr

308-309.

The

emergency room record marked and

admitted into evidence as Exhibit 84 showed pain and stiffness, and
the MRI marked and admitted into evidence as Exhibit 132 showed a
disc bulge,

both at the C5-C6 level of his back.

Tr 313-314.

There was a positive "Patrick's test" with trigger points and local
muscle stiffness.

Tr 316-318.

He pointed where the trigger point

occurred which was found near the C5-C6 level of his back.
1

Tr 319-

320.
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On cross-examination Dr. Simon did not find that Walton's disc
bulges were that meaningful;
residual
caused

Tr 371-372.

pain and myofascial pain from a
by

the

collision.

exaggeration or magnification.

There

was

The

IME

showed mild

whiplash type
no

evidence

injury

of

pain

Tr 321-323.

The defendant's IME Dr. Simon recommended that Walton receive
additional

physical

therapy,

injections, and home exercise.

muscle

relaxers,

Tr 323-324.

trigger

point

Dr. Simon recommended

physical therapy for three to four weeks or six to twelve sessions.
Tr 325-326.

Dr. Simon (surprisingly) had no opinion as to the cost

of the physical therapy, but the Judge permitted the plaintiffs to
argue that Bennett's physical therapy bill was similar since Dr.
Simon had noted it was not unusual or extraordinary.

Tr 330.

Dr. Simon testified that the trigger point injections would be
about $175 each.

Tr 342.

The three trigger point injections would

be necessary at a cost of $525.00 total.

Tr 349.

He thought that

chiropractic and physical therapy could be substituted to some
extent,

and

it

is

not

chiropractic treatment.

unreasonable
Tr 345.

for

Dr.

Walton

to

have

more

Simon testified that the

over-the-counter pain medications used by Walton were reasonable.
Tr 348.
Dr.
good.

Simon testified that he thought Walton's prognosis was
However,

his

condition

would

probably

be

the

especially without intervention, for the rest of his life.
Dr.

Simon also performed an IME on Bennett.

same,
Tr 355.

Tr 356.

His

medical history showed no back problems prior to the collision that
caused pain and stiffness in his lower to middle back.
APPELLANTS' BRIEF
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He was diagnosed to have lumbar back strain,
MRI.

Tr 358.

but recommended no

He thought that Bennett's pain was minimal.

Tr 358.

The Bennett IME found tenderness over the right sacroiliac
area of the right lower back.
rotation of the legs,
359-360.

This

and was positive for Bennett as well.
the

was

The "Patrick's test" is an external

test

in

which

Bennett

felt

Tr

back pain

(popping) that caused the need for more chiropractic treatment.
Dr. Simon thought the second work injury was an aggravation or
exacerbation of the pre-existing back injury caused by the MVC and
could not apportion the damages.

Tr 361-363, 380.

He thought that

the motor vehicle accident predisposed him to the work related
injury within a reasonable medical probability.

Tr 381-382.

Dr.

Simon testified that there was no significant pain magnification by
Bennett.

He testified that Bennett had no history of any prior

chronic back problems or pain prior to the collision.

Tr 364-365.

Dr. Simon thought Bennett's prognosis was good.

He did not

criticize

Bennett

medications.

for

taking

additional

over-the-counter

pain

Tr 366.

The plaintiffs rested.

The defendant called Nancy Patrick.

She admitted that she did not actually see what happened at the
time of the collision,

and admitted to hitting the plaintiffs'

truck on the passenger side.

However,

minimal,

her

despite

tearing

Walton's truck on the road.

off

she said the impact was

bumper,

and
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Tr 388.

The Court then read the jury instructions.
gave closing arguments.

spinning

The parties then

Tr 399.
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Walton argued for an award of his past medical expenses of
$3,030.92,

future

medical expenses

of

$4,972.80,

including Dr.

Simon's recommended treatment of about $1,524.00, future medication
of

$20.00

per

month,

lost

wages

of

suffering of $10,000.00 to $30,000.00.
Bennett

then

argued

for

his

$1,200.00,

and

pain

and

Tr 421-422.
past

medical

expenses

of

$1,878.47, future medical expenses or pain medication of $5,000.00,
lost wages of $2,600.00,
$21,000.00.
The

and pain and suffering of $7,000.00 to

Tr 424.

defendant

argued

in closing that

the

airbags

did not

deploy so it was not a very bad collision, the injury at work to
Bennett was not caused by the collision,
work caused the injury,

i

prior back injuries.

and Bennett's concrete

and there was evidence

(not produced} of

The plaintiffs objected since airbags had not

been brought up or mentioned by any party or witness before this
testimony.

Tr 432.

The Court allowed this in closing and gave no

curative instruction at all.

Id.

These defense arguments were

really the only "new claims" made at trial by either party.
The defendant argued that both plaintiffs should be allowed
their damages for past medical expenses which were stipulated by
the parties.

However,

$700.00 in lost wages.

Bennett should only be awarded $600.00 to
Tr 438.

The damages for pain and suffering

should be awarded in the amount of only $1,000.00 for Bennett, and
$3,000.00 to $4,000.00 for Walton.

Tr 450.

The jury requested a calculator.
them one.

Tr 458-459.

The

The Court would not give

jury awarded the plaintiffs total

damages as follows: Bennett $3,978.47; and Walton $10,030.92.
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4.

a.

Whether

ISSUES ON APPEAL

the complaint

complied with Idaho Code § 12-

120 ( 4) or alleged a claim in excess of $25,000.00?
b.

Whether the complaint prayed for

$25,000.00

an amount

in substantial compliance with Cox v.

less than

Mulligan,

142

Idaho 356, 128 P.3d 893 (2005)?
c.

Whether the decision to deny the Motion to Amend the

Complaint was an abuse of discretion?
d.

Whether there was any new significant item of damage not

set forth in the plaintiffs/appellants' original claim?
e.

Whether the plaintiffs/appellants offered any evidence

(as opposed to argument) of any new item of damage at trial?
f.

Whether the Court should have awarded attorney's fees

under the case law of Johnson v.

Sanchez,

140 Idaho 667,

99 P.3d

620 (Ct. App. 2004), Harris v. Alessi, 141 Idaho 901, 909-910, 120
P.3d 289

l

(Ct. App. 2005)

and Contreras v. Rubley,

142 Idaho 573,

576-577, 130 P. 3d 1111 (2006)?
5.

The

ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL

plaintiffs

and

appellants

Bennett

and

Walton

claim

attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12120 ( 4) .

These attorney's fees and costs are proper in this case

for the reasons stated in this brief.
Rules 35(b) (5), 38, 40 and 41.

See also Idaho Appellate

The plaintiffs reserve the right to

file further statements, and assert a claim for attorney's fee when
this Court issues a decision on the merits.
APPELLANTS' BRIEF
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6.

A.

ARGUMENT

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court exercises free

review over questions of law and

statutory interpretation, like the issues in this case; Johnson v.
Sanchez, 140 Idaho 667, 669, 99 P.3d 620 (Ct. App. 2004), discussed

below with numerous other citations omitted.
Stover,

140 Idaho 927,

929,

104 P.3d 969,

971

See also State v.

(2005);

State v.

Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 689, 85 P.3d 656, 665 (2004); Wattenbarger v.

24 6 P. 3d 961

(2010);

Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 185, 75 P.3d 743

(2003).

A.G.

Edwards

&

Sons,

B.

Inc.

Idaho _ _ ,

IDAHO CODE§ 12-120(4)

Idaho Code§ 12-120(4), provides for an award of costs and
attorney's fees

in civil cases where the amount of the damages

requested is under $25,000.00.

This section provides as follows:

12-120.
Attorney's fees in civil actions - (4) .
In
actions for personal injury, where the amount of
plaintiff's claim for damages does not exceed twenty-five
thousand dollars ($25,000), there shall be taxed and
allowed to the claimant, as part of the costs of the
action, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as
attorney's fees.
For the plaintiff to be awarded
attorney's fees for the prosecution of the action,
written demand for payment of the claim and a statement
of claim must have been served on the defendant's
insurer, if known, or if there is no known insurer, then
on the defendant, not less than sixty (60) days before
the commencement of the action; provided that no
attorney's fees shall be allowed to the plaintiff if the
court finds that the defendant tendered to the plaintiff,
prior to the commencement of the action, an amount at
least equal to ninety percent (90%) of the amount awarded
to the plaintiff.
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The term "statement of the claim" shall mean a
written statement signed by the plaintiff's attorney, or
if no attorney, by the plaintiff which includes:
(a) An itemized statement of each and every item of
damage claimed by the plaintiff including the amount
claimed for general damages and the following items of
special damages: ( i) medical bills incurred up to the
date of the plaintiff's demand;
(ii) a good faith
estimate of future medical. bil.l.s; (iii) lost income
incurred up to the date of plaintiff's demand; (iv) a
good faith estimate of future loss of income; and (v)
property damage for which the plaintiff has not been
paid.
(b) Legible copies of all medical records, bills and
other documentation pertinent to the plaintiff's alleged
damages.
If the plaintiff includes in the complaint filed to
commence the action, or in evidence offered at trial, a
different al.l.eged injury or a significant new item of
damage not set forth in the statement of claim, the
plaintiff shall be deemed to have waived any entitlement
to attorney's fees under this section. (Emphasis added).
The statute only requires that "medical bills incurred up to
the date

of plaintiff's demand"

and a

"good faith

future medical bills" be included in the demand.

estimate of

The key issues in

this case are whether the complaint filed to commence the action,
or in evidence offered at trial, raised a different alleged injury
or significant new item of damage not set forth in the statement of
claim which would require that the plaintiffs be deemed to have
waived any entitlement to attorney's fees.
In this case,

there was a demand made 60 days prior to the

filing of the action on the defendant's insurer, and a statement of
a claim containing an itemized statement of each item of damage,
including past medical expenses, future estimated medical expenses,
lost income, and property damages.

A legible copy of all medical

bills and other documents were included with the original demand.
APPELLANTS' BRIEF
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There is no dispute or objection raised on these matters so the
Court ruled the demand was proper at R Vol. III, p. 485.
In

this

case

the

defendant

did

not

tender,

prior

to

commencement of the action, at least 90% of the amount awarded to
the plaintiffs.

A computation of the amounts tendered before the

filing of the litigation are as follows:
Defendant's
offer
$5,000.00
$2,500.00

Plaintiff
Walton:
Bennett:
Therefore,

under this

90% of jury verdict
$9,027.83
$3,508.62.
the plaintiffs and not the

section,

defendant, are entitled to an award of costs and attorney's fees.
See Gonzalez v. Thacker, 148 Idaho 879, 231 P.3d 524

1.

(2009).

Plaintiff Ben Walton.

In this case Wal ton was awarded over $10,000. 00 at trial.
This was over twice as much as Allstate's final offer of $5,000.00
before the case was filed under Idaho Code§ 12-120(4).

This was

about one-third more than the final Allstate mediation offer and
offer of judgment of $6,484.00.

Therefore,

he

is

clearly the

prevailing party under Idaho Code§ 12-120(4), Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(d) (1), and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 68.
The Court should note that the damages awarded by the jury
included Walton's total past medical expenses, his future medical
expenses

which

reasonably

the

defendant's

medically

necessary,

IME

Dr.

but

Simon
did

not

testified

were

include

any

compensation for lost wages, and only a small portion of Walton's
pain and suffering.
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substantially new or different from what Walton claimed prior to
the filing of this litigation and in his demand letter under Idaho
Code§ 12-120(4).
Walton would argue that the failure to award him more damages
for his pain and suffering was likely motivated by the conduct of
the defendant's counsel as stated in the motion to alter or amend
the judgment.

The jury did not award the amount suggested to them

by counsel plaintiff's in closing argument~ so there was no harm or
prejudice

to

the

defendant

from

the

argument

in

this

case.

However, this supports awarding the plaintiff Walton his costs and
attorney's fees to increase damages for pain and suffering to a
more reasonable amount.
2.

Plaintiff Mat Bennett

In this case Bennett was awarded about $4,000.00 by the jury.
This was almost twice as much as what Allstate offered to Bennett
prior to litigation being filed under Idaho Code§ 12-120(4), so
Bennett is entitled to his costs and attorney's fees under that
section.

The jury award was also more than the first Allstate

offer of judgment made on April 29,

2010 in this case.

Bennett

notes that under the law he was the prevailing party up to that
point.
However, Allstate made a second offer of judgment on May 18,
2010 to "Plaintiff Mathew Bennett in the amount of Four Thousand
Thirty-Two Dollars ($4,032.00).

In this offer the plaintiff would

be required to pay any and all remaining subrogation demands or
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claims of liens, and any attorney's fees allowed by contract or law
as well as costs incurred to date."

See R Vol. II, p. 267.

This

offer of judgment expressly included "all attorney's fees allowable
by contract or by law as well as costs incurred to date" which is
the same language included in the adjusted award under IRCP 68(b).
The adjusted award for Bennett was computed by the Court to be
a total of $5,065.11.

R Vol.

III,

p.

491.

This included pre-

judgment interest and costs, but no attorney's fees at all, which
would have substantially increased his award.
Bennett notes that if Allstate would have made an offer prior
to

the

case being

filed

of

over

$4,000.00

and/or

an

offer of

judgment of $4,000.00, plus accrued costs and attorney's fees to be
set by the Court, which was declined by Bennett, then they may be
entitled to their costs.

I

Allstate should have doubled their offer

before the case was filed,

and increased their offer to include

costs and attorney's fees after the case was filed, in their offers
of judgment.

Instead they spent almost the amount in controversy

in Court costs to try to defeat the plaintiffs' valid claim.

The

failure to do so makes liability for Bennett's costs and attorney's
fees clear under Idaho Code§ 12-120(4) and IRCP 68(b).
The Court should compare the offer and recovery for each party
independently.
732 P.2d 355

Gilbert v.

City of Caldwell, 112 Idaho 386, 399,

(Ct. App. 1987).

However, even if the Court combines the offers, the plaintiffs
as a group are still the prevailing parties.
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13l Idaho 556,
68 (b).

559-560,

961 P.2d 647

In this later case the

( 998); instructive on Rule

strict Court granted an additur

then held that based on the additur alone, without costs and fees,
the plaintiff was entitled to costs

C.

attorney's fees.

THE COMPLAINT COMPLIED WITH IDAHO CODE§ 12-120(4)

The decision on post-t

al motions raised for the first time

a claim that over $25,000.00 was sought in the complaint.

In fact,

the plaintiffs note that the Verified Complaint was filed for an
sunder Idaho Code

amount under $25,000.00 and sought attorney's
§ 12-120(4), as stated specifically in

Prayer at paragraphs A

and B, last sentence, and paragraph Con attorney's
The Prayer of the complaint is s

es and costs.

above, and attached hereto.

The issue or objection that over $25,000.00 had been prayed
Patrick or her

for in the complaint was not raised by
insurer at any time.
19,

See Defendant's Answer at R Vol.

Defendant's Objection to Plainti

I pages 18-

Post-T

Additur, Interest, Costs and Attorney's Fees fil
R Vol. II, p. 362; and the entire case

le, s

Motions for
July 7, 2010 at
this claim was

not ever made by the defendant.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) provides
assert all affirmative defenses in their answer.

a party must
The

lure to

raise this defense may be considered a waiver of that claim or
See McKee Brothers

Ltd.

v.

Mesa

Equipment,

Inc.,

02

Idaho 202, 202-203, 628 P.2d 1036 (1981).
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Moreover, the failure to make an objection or raise the claim
that the complaint failed to comply with§ 12-120(4), in response
to the plaintiffs' motion for costs and attorney's fees, should be
construed as a waiver of that claim as well.

See Conner v. Dake,

103 Idaho 761, 653 P.2d 1173 (1982), failure to object as a waiver
of right to contest an award of attorney's fees.
The defendant understood that there would be a claim under
Idaho

Code

§

unambiguous.

12-120(4),

since

the

complaint

is

plain

and

The defendant waived any claim or defense to the

contrary by her failure to object and raise this defense in their

I

answer or subsequent pleadings.
Second, the Court should recall that the statute at Idaho Code
§ 12-120(4), only states that, "If the plaintiff includes in the
complaint filed to commence the action, or in evidence offered at
trial,

a different alleged injury or a significant new item of

damage not set forth in the statement of claim, the plaintiff shall
be deemed to have waived any entitlement to attorney's fees under
this section."
not

preclude

$25,000.00,

(Emphasis added).
filing

a

complaint

The statute, on its face,
with

a

prayer

in

does

excess

of

just a different alleged injury or a significant new

item of damages.

There was no significant new item of damage since

the IME of the plaintiffs by Dr. Simon had not taken place, and the
prayer is the same as the demand letter.
Further, the statute requires a good faith estimate of future
medical bills.

There is no way a plaintiff can know the exact
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amount

of

their

future

medical

treatment

and

bills

if

their

treatment is not complete and they have not fully recovered.
It is important to note that the complaint did not include or
allege a different injury or a significant new item of damages not
set forth in the statement of claim.

The amount prayed for in the

complaint does not even have to be stated, as it was in this case,
to be less than $25,000.00.
The Idaho Supreme Court rejected a substantially similar claim
that the amount of damages prayed for barred an attorney's fees
claim under Idaho Code§ 12-120(4) in Cox v. Mulligan,
356, 128 P.3d 893 (2005).

142 Idaho

This court held that a plaintiff was not

even required to plead for damages under $25,000.00,

where the

plaintiff made a written demand that complied with Idaho Code§ 121

120(4), and the amount awarded by the jury is less than $25,000.00.
The Court noted that a

complaint,

like the in this case,

requested damages of $25,000.00 or less,
statute.

that

would comply with the

The Court reasoned, at 142 Idaho 358, as follows:

The Defendants argue that the pleading requirement
of subsection ( 1) is essential to put defendants on
notice that the plaintiff is seeking attorney's fees. We
disagree. Under subsection (1), the complaint would
include an allegation that the damages sought do not
exceed $25,000.00.
Under subsection (4), the statement
of claim would include an itemized list of damages that
did not exceed $25,000.00.
The allegation in the
complaint required by subsection (1) would not provide
any greater notice than the allegations in the statement
of claim served under subsection (4).
Finally, the plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint under
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b)
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since the amount awarded by the jury was under $25,000.00.
III, p. 495-496.

R Vol.

This motion was denied by the District Court, but

should have been granted to

cure

any alleged ambiguity

in the

complaint as to the amount claimed.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) states as follows:

Ru1e 15(b). Amendments to conform to the evidence.
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings.
Such amendment of the p1eadings as may be
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend
does not affect the result of the trial of these issues.
If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground
that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings,
the court may allow the p1eadings to be amended and sha11
do so free1y when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party
fai1s to satisfy the court that the admission of such
evidence wou1d prejudice the party in maintaining the
party's action or defense upon the merits. The court may
grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet
such evidence.
( Emphasis supplied) .
Therefore, this Court has ruled that unless surprise or unfair

l

prejudice is shown, the amount of a claim may be amended to conform
to the proof,

See

even during or after a trial on the merits.

Resource Engineering

Inc. v. Nancy Lee Mines, Inc., 110 Idaho 136,

137, 714 P.2d 526 (Ct. App. 1985).
Thus, where no facts had been presented to show any specific
unfair advantage and the defendant was informed in the plaintiffs'
first pleading, and had been on notice throughout the litigation,
that

the plaintiff

whatever

amount

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
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court

to

claim

might

foreclosure

determine,

the

of

a

lien

district

for

court
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abused its discretion by refusing to allow a revision of the amount
claimed for the pleaded time period. Resource Engineering

Inc. V.

Nancy Lee Mines, Inc., supra, 110 Idaho at 138.
In conclusion, the complaint was correctly pled with no new or
different claims to obtain an award of attorney's fees and costs
re was no defense raised in the

under Idaho Code§ 12-120(4).

that it did not do so.

answer or an objection in any later p

ion in Cox v. Mulligan, that the

The Court should reaffirm the dee

fendant on notice of the

prayer is sufficient if it puts the
potential
$25,000.00.

claim

for

Finally,

fees,

more

than

re is any ambiguity,

this

can

but

filed

to the extent

for

Court should grant the plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint.
D.

No Evidence of Any Different or New Item of Damage at Trial.
The Court

then

finds

that

there

was

injury from that stated in the claim, but
the

plaintiffs

"included in

Court "be

their

eved" that

red at

significant new item of damage not set
statement of the claim."

no different alleged

trial

a

in their original

See Decision on Post-Judgment Motions R

Vol. III, p. 486-487; Tr 502, L. 12-17 and 502-503.

p

intiffs

strongly disagree factually (as stated above) and

ly (as set

out below) for the following reasons.
The

ad case interpreting this statute is the case of Johnson

v. Sanchez, supra, 140 Idaho at 667.
made

a

statement

of the claim as

In this case the

a

iff

required by Idaho Code § 12-

120 {4), waited for 60 days, then sued for damages under $25,000.00.
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However,

"During

the

trial,

Johnson

presented

testimony

and

argument to the jury reflecting her damages in an amount greater
140 Idaho

than the amount demanded in her statement of claim."
668.

Further, "Johnson's statement of the claim submitted damages

in the amount of $3,500.00 for future medical bills.

However, at

trial Johnson presented video-tape deposition testimony of a doctor
Johnson's

future

medical

bills

could

cost

as

$15,000.00 but could reach as high as $100,000.00."
The

jury awarded

$21,126.00

in damages,

and

attorney's fees which was affirmed on appeal.

the

little

as

Id at 669.

court

awarded

This decision is "on

all fours" and clearly supports an award of attorney's fees to the
plaintiffs in this case.
The

Johnson

v.

Sanchez Court

began

the

analysis

with

the

standard of free review in statutory interpretation under the plain
meaning rule, at 140 Idaho 669, as follows:
The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law over which
we exercise free review. Zener v. Velde, 135 Idaho 352, 355,
17 P.3d 296, 299 (Ct. App. 2000). When interpreting a statute,
we will construe the statute as a whole to give effect to the
legislative intent.
George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger,
118 Idaho 537, 539-40, 797 P.2d 1385, 1387-88 (1990); Zener,
135 Idaho at' 355, 17 P. 3d at 299. The plain meaning of a
statute will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative
intent is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd
results. Watkins Family, 118 Idaho at 540, 797 P.2d at 1388;
Zener, 135 Idaho at 355, 17 P.3d at 299.
(Emphasis supplied).
The Trial Court Judge, who was affirmed on appeal, held that
there was no waiver of attorney's fees in this case as follows:
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Sanchez raised the issue of whether significant new
items of damage were offered at trial in his motion to
disallow attorney fees. In addressing the motion, the
district court stated:
Having reviewed the evidence, as well as the
statement of claim, it is this Court's determination that
[Johnson] did not offer evidence at trial of a different
injury or of a significant new item of damage. However,
there is no doubt that [Johnson] did submit evidence at
trial which would have permitted the jury to award an
amount of damages in excess of the amount set forth in
the statement of claim.
Even if one were to classify
such evidence as constituting a "new item of damage," the
amount in question was such that it did not constitute a
"significant" new i tern of damage.
Based on the
foregoing, it is the determination of this Court that
[Johnson] did not waive [99 P.3d 623] attorney fees and
is, pursuant to the provisions of I.e.§ 12-120(4),
entitled to the same.
The Appeals Court went on to hold there was no significant new
item of damages claimed, at 140 Idaho 670, ss follows
No Idaho case law exists construing the phrase
"significant new i tern of damage not set forth in the
statement of claim." However,
I.C.
§ 12-120 (4) (a)
outlines the requirements for a statement of claim, which
includes a statement for general damages and certain
"items" of special damages such as medical bills and
future
lost
wages.
Johnson
complied
with
the
requirements in I.C. § 12-120 (4) (a). At trial, Johnson
did not present evidence of items not listed in the
statement of claim, such as property damage.
Johnson
only offered evidence with respect to those items already
listed in the statement of claim. Nevertheless, Johnson
provided evidence of an increased amount of damages.
Thus, we must determine whether the offering evidence of
different amounts of damages in this case constituted a
significant new item of damage.
Idaho Code Section 12-120(4) presumes that the
amount of damages may change from the time the statement
of claim is drafted to the date of trial. For instance,
the statute requires that the plaintiff include a "good
faith estimate" of future medical bills and of future
loss of income. It does not require that the plaintiff
list the precise amount that will later be presented at
trial. In personal injury cases such as this one, it may
APPELLANTS' BRIEF
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be years after the statement of claim is submitted before
the case reaches trial and the parties present evidence
of damages.
Even if a plaintiff submits a statement of
claim with his or her good faith estimate of damages, at
the time of trial the plaintiff may have incurred more
damages that were not earlier foreseen and may have a
more accurate estimate of the amount of future damages
because of intervening developments. Therefore, although
Johnson presented evidence of an increased amount of
damages at trial, this does not in itself constitute a
waiver of attorney fees. Having reached this conclusion
on the plain meaning of "significant new items of damage
not set forth in the statement of claim," we cannot
conclude that the district court abused its discretion in
its findings. Where a trial court's findings are not
clearly erroneous and where the trial court properly
identifies and applies the law to the facts, then the
trial court's exercise of discretion has not been abused.
Crawford v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co., 112 Idaho 820,
822, 736 P.2d 872, 874 (Ct. App. 1987).
The

Idaho

Supreme

Court

went

even

further

and

rejected a

similar defense claim in the case of Contreras v. Rubley,
142 Idaho at 573, 576-577.

supra,

The Court held that even a new property

damage claim of $2,500.00 "was not significant enough to constitute
a waiver of Contreras' right to attorney's fees" under§ 12-120(4).
The Court found this sum was insignificant when compared to the
total claim that was made and was not a factor in the decision made
by the defendant's insurer to deny the claim.
The Court in Contreras v. Rubley noted there was no prejudice
to

the

defendants

from

the

undisputedly

new

claim,

since

the

defendants had failed to settle the case and the jury verdict was
ultimately under $25,00.00.

The Court ruled, at 142 Idaho 577:

Even though evidence of the property damage was new,
it is not significant enough to constitute a waiver of
Contreras' right to attorney fees. Contreras' original
Statement of Claim to Rubley's insurer on June 18, 2002,
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sought $20,000 in damages.
The insurer disclaimed
liability for the accident and made no tender to
respondents in an attempt to settle the case. *** As
Rubley's insurer disclaimed any liability by concluding
Siebanthaler was 100% responsible for the accident, it is
difficult to see how a lack of awareness of damage to the
car played any part in Rubley' s insurer's refusal to
settle prior to the commencement of the suit. We affirm
the district court's award of attorney fees to Contreras
made pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(4).
Similarly, the Court in Harris v. Alessi, supra, 141 Idaho at
901,

909-910 held that even though one medical bill had not been

presented, that a small difference in the claim did not constitute
a

waiver

of

costs

and attorney's

fees.

The

Court

ruled

that

because the insurance company already knew about all the bills at
the time the case was filed and during settlement negotiations,
there was substantial compliance with the statute.

7.
First,

CONCLUSION

it is the items of damage and amount stated in the

written demand, and not the amount stated in the complaint, that is
the touchstone; Cox v. Mulligan (supra).

The claims in this case

(for past and future estimated medical expenses, lost wages, pain
and suffering)

were totally identical in the demand letter and

complaint, which expressly complied with Idaho Code§ 12-120(4).
The

defendant's

Answer

failed

to

object

or

affirmative defense to the award of attorney's fees
Code

§

Rather,

12-120 ( 4) ,
the

which

parties

were

stipulated

all
and

waived
the

under
Court

the

raise

any

under Idaho
case

ordered

in

law.
the

defendant Patrick's bankruptcy that there would be no award in

l

excess of $25,000.00 to each plaintiff under the Allstate policy;
APPELLANTS' BRIEF
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which was the law of the case after that date,

really making any

opposition to an award of attorney's fees based on the complaint or
arguments

at

trial

under

Idaho

Code

§

12-120 ( 4)

in

this

case

legally irrelevant and moot.
The

defendant

attorney's

fees

complaint,

in

then

under

all

her

also
Idaho
later

failed
Code

to
§

post-trial

object

to

12-120(4)

an

award

based

on

the

motions

and

pleadings,

oppositions to the plaintiffs' motions.

of

There was a double and

even triple waiver of these defenses under the case law.
Second, the plaintiffs' injuries and claims have always been

I

the same and they never made any claim to any DIFFERENT or NEW
injury or i tern of damage.
injuries

that

included

The plaintiffs made claims for back

damages

for

past

and

estimated

future

medical expenses, lost wages, and pain and suffering.
This is shown from the summary of damages attached to the
demand letter and the closing argument made to the jury.
no new claim made at all,

and the claims are in fact virtually

identical: past medical bills,
pain and suffering.

There is

future medical bills,

lost wages,

The plaintiffs did not offer any evidence of

any kind of any new injury or item of damages at trial.

There is

no place in the record where the plaintiffs presented any evidence
of any kind of new injury, like, for example, a foot or arm injury,
property damage claim, lost consortium, etc.
The plaintiffs'

only adjusted and slightly increased their

prior estimated item of damages
APPELLANTS' BRIEF
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solely on the evidence at trial of the defendant's IME Dr. Simon as
to their need for future medical care and events that transpired at
the IME.

The plaintiffs then presented a closing argument that the

jury could consider increasing the items of prior damage for future
medical care, pain and suffering.
As to Walton, it is true that the defendant/respondent's IME
doctor prescribed additional future medical care to him, but this
was for his same old back injury (not a new injury) to his spine at
CS-6.

This only slightly increased his estimated future medical

care claim by about $1,500.00,

which is far less than $2,500.00

discussed in Contreras v. Rubley, supra; and increased the argument
made to the jury to consider a higher range for future pain and
suffering.
As to Bennett, the IME "Patrick's test" was positive, which
caused an aggravation of his prior symptoms for which he sought
treatment
medication

from his
that

chiropractor and used over-the-counter pain

caused

some

relief.

This

only

increased

estimated future medical care claim by about $168. 00,
again far less than $2,500.00 discussed in Contreras v.

his

which is
Rubley,

supra; and increased the argument made to the jury to consider a
higher range for future pain and suffering.
The Court should rule that the testimony and evidence of the
defendant/respondent's IME Dr. Simon, including opinions on future
necessary medical care, may be introduced by the plaintiffs without
waiving attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120, and the cases of
APPELLANTS' BRIEF
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Johnson

v.

(supra).

Sanchez,

Contreras

v.

Rubley,

and Harr is v.

Alessi

Otherwise, the defendant may obtain an IME without fear

of an adverse opinion which will never see the light of day, the
truth will be suppressed and not known to the jury, plaintiffs will
go under-compensated and justice denied to injured Idahoans.

The

plaintiffs' counsel had an ethical obligation to pursue the case
zealously and within the bounds of the law.

There was a legitimate

dispute as to how much the damages for pain and suffering for the
same old injuries the jury should award and the IME was clearly
relevant on that issue.

The defendant can claim no prejudice from

her own IME being put into evidence.
Further, the Court should affirm the old horn book rule that

arguments are not evidence under IDJI 1.00 and 1.05.
the

jury

was

instructed

twice

that

closing

In this case

arguments

are

not

evidence, at R Vol. II, p. 212 and 213, as follows:
Just as the opening statements are not evidence,
neither are the closing arguments.
During the closing
arguments, the attorneys will summarize the evidence to
help you understand how it relates to the law.
In determining the facts, you may consider only the
evidence admitted in this trial. This evidence consists
of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted
into evidence, and any undisputed or admitted facts.
While the arguments and remarks of the attorneys may help
you understand the evidence and apply the instructions,
what they say is not evidence.
If any attorney's
argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you
should disregard it.
Moreover, an argument for increased damages is not prohibited
by Idaho Code§ 12 120(4) either expressly or by implication.
argument that the
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amount

in

a

range

The
of
42

$7,000.00 to $41,000.00 for pain and suffering for these same old
injuries that were already in evidence is not improper.
this

is

consistent with the case

law including,

In fact,

especially the

cases of Contreras v. Rubley and Johnson v. Sanchez.
In the experience of the plaintiffs'

counsel,

juries rarely

award the amount claimed by the plaintiff in closing arguments, and
frequently reduce these claims by 50%

In cases like

(one-half).

this, where the defendant is a sympathetic older woman and the jury
is

not

informed

damages

would

there

be

is

expected

any
to

insurance,
be

the

reduced by

jury's
the

award

jury,

for

and was

significantly reduced in this case.
There has never been a case that holds that a "significant
difference" in amounts asked for in oral argument (for the same old
injuries) amounts to a "significant new item of damage" which would
warrant

denial

of

attorney's

fees.

This

holding

is

totally

contrary to the express language of the statute, and all the case
law interpreting it.

The Court

"argument" is not "evidence",

should re-affirm the rule that

and plaintiffs'

counsel may argue

from the same old existing evidence, the jury may award damages in
excess of $25,000 without waiving the right to claim attorney's fee
under

the

other cases

cited above

since

there

is

no

different

alleged injury or a significant new item of damage in evidence.
Moreover, even if this were a decision that was left to the
discretion of the District Court,

the denial of attorney's fees

under the circumstances of this case would be a clear abuse of
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discretion.

The jury clearly intended that the plaintiffs receive

the entire amount of their verdict,

without a reduction for any

kind of Court costs or attorney's fees.

If the Court fails to

grant attorney's fees, the plaintiffs will not have the benefit of
their bargain and their contract agreed in the stipulation that the
defendant pay their past medical bills.
The

policy

behind

the

statute

is

clearly

to

encourage

defendants to make reasonable settlement offers before the case is
even filed.

The court's decision does not encourage the defendants

to settle, but instead rewards them for making inadequate initial
offers, contesting liability through summary judgment, continuing
to make inadequate offers of judgment, and forcing cases to trial;
then

making

totally

improper

arguments

based

on

worker's

compensation insurance, the seat belt defense and the similar air
bag defense, and otherwise.

The Court's decision did not make the

plaintiffs' whole since they had to pay their attorney's fees and
costs.
applies,

If an erroneous and hyper-technical reading of the statute
then no

attorney will

take

on these

injury cases because of the risks involved,

smaller personal

and victims will go

uncompensated or under-compensated.
There can only be a forced waiver of attorney's fees if: there
is evidence offered at trial of a significant new item of damage
not set forth in the statement of the claim.

In this case,

the

claim was for the same injuries and same damages,

al though the

amount of claim for pain and suffering was higher,

which is not
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only expected to occur, but is expressly allowed by the Court in
Johnson vs. Sanchez and the other cases, supra.

The intent of the statute seems to be to prevent a plaintiff
from making a written demand under§ 12-120(4) that intentionally
omits a specific item of damages, and then claiming attorney's fees
on top of a large award in excess of $25,000.00.

This type of

"sandbagging" is not present here since there is no claim for any
specific new item of damages and the total damages awarded were
less than $25,000.00, to both plaintiffs.
In any case, the total amount awarded was less than $25,000.00
for all these same claims (past and future medical expenses, lost
wages, and pain and suffering).

The amounts awarded at trial for

each item of damage were the same or less than the demand letter to
Allstate.
damages

I

The plaintiffs'

argument

for an additional award of

(for the same old alleged injuries)

jury to a large extent.

was rejected by the

An excessive verdict may be modified by

remittur, which was done here and granted here by the Court.

There

was no harm or prejudice to the defendant from the plaintiffs'
claim at trial,

and the intent of the legislature is that they

should get their fees.
Finally,
that

there

there was a Bankruptcy Court stipulation and order

would be

no

award

in excess

plaintiff under the Allstate policy.

of

$25,000.00

to

each

This was the law of the case

after that date really making the rest of the defendant's claims of
any

opposition

to
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an

award

of

attorney's

fees

based

on

the
45

arguments

at

trial

under

Idaho

Code

§

12-120 ( 4)

in

this

case

irrelevant and moot.
WHEREFORE,
request that this

the

appellants/plaintiffs

Bennett

and

Walton

Court reverse the decision of the District Court

so that the legitimate and valid claims for costs and attorney's
fees be awarded to the appellants/plaintiffs.
DATED this 30 th day of March, 2011.

Charles Johnson
JOHNSON OLSON CH
Attorney for Appellants/Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed two copies and e-mailed a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document, by placing the same in
the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Brendon C. Taylor
Jared Steadman
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 991
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991

jsteadman@merrillandmerrill.com
bt@merrillandmerrill.com

on this 30 th day of March, 2011.
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------EXHIBIT
1 61

JOHNSON OLSONr

CHARTERED

P. 0. BOX 1 7.25
POCATELLO, IDAHO 83204-1725

L. C!!ARLES JOHNSON, III
TELEPHONE:
(208) 232-7926
FACSIMILE:
(208) 232-9161
EMAIL, cjlaw@allidaho.com

July 9, 2008

USE P.O. BOX FOR MAI
PHYSICAL STREET ADDRES
419 WEST BENTO,
POCATELLO, IDAHO 83204-172,

Beulah Geren
Barrett Saito
Allstate
Company
Idaho-E. Washington
P.O. Box 6828
Boise, Idaho 83707-0828
Re:
INSURED:
DATE OF LOSS~
CLAIM NO:

Mathew Bennett and Benjamin Walton v. Nancy Patrick
NANCY PATRICK
October 18, 2007

0105166771

Dear Ms. Geren and Ms. Saito:
·This acknowledges my prior letter to you dated May 8, 2008
(copy
enclosed) regarding ·the case of Mathew R. Bennett· and·
Benjamin L. Walton v. Nancy Patrick.
This letter is written to
update and supplement that letter with the following information.
You have admitted your c.liene,is totally at fault and we propose to
settle the case in
11 with Allstate and not pursue claims
the road construction companies who probably have no fault.
First, Mathew Bennett and Benjamin Walton have basically
completed· their treatment and substantially recovered from
injuries they suffe~ed from·the motor vehicle collision in this
case. They continue to have some minor residual pain and suffering
but.have now completed their chiropractic treatment with Dr. Henry
West.
Second., I am enclosing an Exhibit List including all the
medical records for Mathew Bennett and Benjamin Walton in this
case.
There are no other medical records on
of these
individuals that we know of at this time.
Third, I am enclosing a list of the medical providers, medical
bills, and damages summaries for these individuals. This includes
the
11 amount of 'their wage loss to date.
·
Benjamin Walton was seen at the emergency room immediately
a
the motor vehicle collision.
He had severe neck pain and
complained of being nauseated. Benjamin Walton was diagnosed with
Cervical Spine Strain and Lumbar Spine Strain. He was instructed
to wear a soft collar for a week, do no lifting, and then follow up
with his physician if his condition did not improve. The x-rays at
the hospital showed a mild straightening
the lumbar spine
associated with muscle spasm.

Ben Walton was then seen by Dr. Richard Maynard for pain and
stiffness in his lower back.
He missed work
about one week,
causing losses of $1,000.00 to $1,200.00.
He was treated
conservatively with pain relievers ,,1"8d then chi rnnr;:i ,-,·H,., ~ -- - .._ __
.,=......,,,......,,.,..,

T"\-......

rt ..... ----

......
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The medical records of Dr. Henry West were positive for
several tests with limited range of motion and pain in his cervical
spine, f oraminal compression tests, shoulder depressant tests,
Bickele's test, the Sitting root tests and bilateral leg raise.
The cervical spine x-rays show a significant injury at C-7.
The cervical spine MRI shows minor posterior broad-based disc
bulqes at C4-5 and C5-6 and cervical disc syndrome from the motor
vehicle collision.
Dr. Henry West diagnosed Benjamin Walton with
acute traumatic side lash cervical sprain/strain,
brachial
radiculopathy,
and
mid-level
inter-sigmental
dysfunction
characterized by akinesis and acute lumbar strain and limitations
in the range of motion in the cervical and lumbar spine.
However, Benjamin Walton's injuries significantly improved
from the chiropractic treatment administered by Dr. Henry West. He
advises that at this point he still has only minimal residual pain
and stiffness in his neck and some headaches that he.treats with
over-the-counter medication.
was seen at the emergency room immediately
after the motor vehicle collision. He complained of moderate neck
and back pain with stiffness and chest pain. He was diagnosed with
acute and chronic
musculoskeletal low back pain from the motor
vehicle collision. He was given medications, including Flexoral,
and Vicodin. Dr. Evan Holmstead saw Mathew Bennett on October 30,
2007 for his complaints of low back pain from the motor vehicle
collision.
He has liini ted range of motion with a fin ding of
objective paraspinous muscle spasm.
He was given a release from
work from Evan Holmstead, M.D., (marked as Exhibit 53).
He then
received physical therapy at Portneuf Physical Therapy for about
three weeks.
He attempted to work but his back pain flared up
during this process., He improved slowly and had some progress from
this treatment, but still had returning flare ups in his pain.
Mathew Bennett

On November 20, 2007 Mathew Bennett was again seen at the
emergency room for low back pain. He was apparently unable to work
for about another week after this flare up in his symptoms.
The
doctor again found lumbar muscle spasm with low back pain and
continued him on physical therapy and light duty work, and
continued his prescription of Flexoral and-other pain relievers.
He has worked in pain for the last several months.
Mathew Bennett then sought further chiropractic treatment from
Dr. Henry West for his injuries.
His tests were positive for
several
objective problems.
He then received chiropractic
treatment,
including
DMT
spinal,
electro-stimulation,
and
ultrasound.
He has substantially recovered after his treatment
from physical therapy and treatment from Dr. West, but he still
uses over-the-counter pain medications.

Allstate
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In my opinion, a reasonable Bannock County jury would find no
negligence on the part of Benjamin Walton and find Nancy Patrick
totally at fault. However, if this claim is not resolved with your
organization then Mathew Bennett and Benj.amin Walton reserve the
right to join any other parties that are or may be responsible in
this case.
Finally, I have summarized Mathew Bennett and Benjamin
Walton's medical bills, pain and suffering and lost wages on the
enclosed damages summaries. A reasonable Bannock County jury would
probably award reasonable compensation and damages to· Mathew
Bennett in the amount of at least $20,000.00, and Benjamin Walton
in the amount of at least $23,000.00.
Therefore, these claimants would be willing to settle this
case for a payment to them in these amounts, if accepted within the
next sixty (60) days.
If this offer is not accepted then Mathew
Bennett and Benjamin Walton reserve the rig~t to file a lawsuit for
recovery of their damages,
lost _wages, costs, expenses and
attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(4).
If you have any questions or comments, please call or write.
Sincerely,

Charles Johnson
CJ/nv
Enclosure
c:

Clients

MATTHEW R. BENNETT
DAMAGES SUMMARY
MEDICAL BILLS

Portneuf Medical Center 10/18/08

$291.00

Portn(=uf Medical Center 11/20/08

$631. 84

Portneuf Medical Center Physical Therapy
11/26/08 through 11/27/07

$316.00

Portneuf Medical Center Physical Therapy
12/06/07-

$116.00

Mountain View Family Medicine (Dr. Evan Holmstead)
10/30/07 and 11/29/07

$191·. 60

West Chiropractic (Dr. Henry West)

$310.00

Shopko Pharmacy Prescriptions
10/18/07 through 04/21/08

$81.27

TOTAL MEDICAL

$1,937.71

Future Medical Bills; estimated to be $20.00 a month for
pain medication for rest of life expectancy plus future
medical care as necessary

$2,500.00

LOST WAGES

Lost Wages of $26.00} an hour, ·for the dat~ accident for
two and a half weeks at eight hours a day

$2,600.00

PAIN AND SUFFERING

Pain and Suffering (estimated three times bills)

$13,500.00

TOTAL

$2Q, 60.0. 00

BENJAMIN L. WALTON
DAMAGES SOMMA.RY
MEDICAL BILLS
Portneuf Medical Center 10/18/07
Primary Care Specialists
10/26/07 ·and 11/09/07

$917:00

(Dr. Richard Maynard)

West Chiropractic
11/21/07 through 05/07/08

$2-02. 42
$703.00

Idaho Medical Imagin~ 02/19/08

-

(MRI)

$1,170.50

TOTAL MEDICAL

$2 ,'992. 92

Future Medical Bills; estimated to be $20.00 a month for
pain medication for rest of life expectancy plus future
medical care as necessary

$2,500.00

LOST· WAGES
Lost Wages for one week from the date accident

$1,200.00

PAIN AND SUFFERING
bills)
Pain and Suffering (estimated three times medical
---

$l6,500.00

TOTAL

$23,200.00

'l'I

n

Charles Johnson
JOHNSON OLSON CHARTERED
419 West Benton
P.O. Box 1725
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1725
Telephone: (208) 232-7926
Facsimile: (208) 232-9161
ISB No. 2464
E-Mail: cjlaw@allidaho.com
Attorney
Plaintiffs
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
)

MATHEW R. BENNETT and
BENJAMIN L. WALTON,

Case No.

W · '\)"\ \AStl'b ~-:s:._

)

)

Filing

Category Al $88.00

)

)
)
)
)

vs.
NANCY PATRICK,
Defendant.

------------The plaintiffs,

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR
PERSONAL-J:NJURY.DAMAGES
IN AUTOMOBILE COLLISION AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

)
)
)

I

Mathew R.

Bennett and Benjamin L.

Walton,

individually and through their counsel of record, hereby fi
VERIFIED

COMPLAINT

FOR

PERSONAL

INJURY

DAMAGES

IN

this

AUTOMOBILE

COLLISION AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL against the defendant, Nancy
Patrick, and complains, pleads, and
A.

1.

leges as follows.

PARTIES

The plaintiff, Mathew R. Bennett, at all times material

hereto, was a resident of Pocatello, Bannock County, Idaho.
2.

The plaintiff, Benjamin L. Walton, at all times material

hereto, was a resident of Pocatel1o, Bannock County, Idaho.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT

1

(
Henry West were positive for several tests with limited range of
motion and pain in his cervical spine, foraminal compression tests,
shoulder depressant tests, Bickele's test, the Sitting root tests
and

bilateral

leg

The

raise.

cervical

spine

x-rays

show

a

significant injury at C-7.
24.

Therefore,

Dr.

Henry West then referred' the plaintiff

Walton to have an MRI at Idaho Medical Imaging.

The cervical ·spine

MRI shows minor posterior broad-based disc bulges at C4-5 and CS-6
from

the

Benjamin

motor

vehicle

Wal ton

sprain/strain,

with

brachial

collision.
acute

Dr.

traumatic

radiculopathy,

Henry

West

diagnosed

side

lash

cervical

and

mid-level

inter-

sigmental dysfunction characterized by akinesis and acute lumbar
strain and limitations in the. range of motion in the cervical and
lumbar spine.
25.

However,

the plaintiff Walton's injuries significantly

improved from the chiropractic treatment admini'stered by Dr. Henry
West.

He advises that at this point he still has only minimal

residual pain and stiffness in his neck and some headaches that he
treats with over-the-counter medication.
2 6.

The

plaintiff

Walton

also

has

lost

wages

from

this

collision in the amount of about $1,200.00.

E.
WHEREFORE,
Walton,

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

plaintiffs,

Mathew R.

Bennett

pray for judgments agaitist defendant,

and

Benjamin

L.

Nancy Patrick,

as

vehicle owner, responsible party and negligent driver as follows:

VERIFIED COMPLAINT

7

A.

Special damages for plaintiff Mat Bennett's past medical

bills of $1,937.71, future medical bills for over the counter pain
medication, and lost wages of $2,600.00; and general damages for
pain and suffering in an amount in excess of $10,000.00, or such
other amounts as may be proven to a jury at trial, but less than
$25,000.00 at this time;

B.
of

Special damages for plaintiff Ben Walton's medical bills

$2,992.92,

future

medical

bills

for

over

the

counter pain

medication, lost wages of $1,200.00, and general damages for pain
and suffering in an amount in excess of $10,000.00, or such other
amounts

as

may be

proven

to

a

jury at

trial,

but

less

than

$25,000.00 at this time;

C.

For attorney's fees and costs in-b-ringing this action, in

the amount of $2,000.00 if by default and future attorney's fees
under Idaho Code§ 12-120(4); and
D.

For stich other and further r~lief as this Court deems

just and equitable under the premises for plaintiff.

'lvf'(J_

DATED t h i s ~ day of October 2008.

Charles Johnson
JURY DEMAND

Plaintiffs demand a jury trial on all claims in the complaint.

Charles Johnson

VERIFIED COMPLAINT
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